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sonal injury, death, and property damages resulting from an unreasonably
dangerous product. For these losses, the section 402A remedy is appropriate,
particularly in light of the different treatment accorded them by the U.C.C.
Direct economic loss, which by its nature cannot exceed the purchase price
of the product, is far less drastic than personal injury, physical property,
and product damages. Given the warranty limitations imposed by the
legislature and the absence of special considerations that prompted the adoption of section 402A, direct economic loss should remain a matter of contract.
JOHN WARSHAWSKY

REMOVAL AND THE CHILD'S
BEST INTERESTS IN CHANGE
OF CUSTODY DISPUTES
Galeener v. Black1
Russel and Linda Black were divorced in 1973. The court granted Linda
custody of their only child along with child support; it granted Russel
reasonable visitation rights. In 1979, Linda filed a motion to modify child
support. 2 In his answer, Russel sought a change of custody. He alleged that
his son preferred to live with him and that he could provide proper care and
supervision for the child. 3 He further claimed that Linda was about to

1. 606 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980). The Galeener court did not discuss
the constitutional right to travel, right to privacy, and right to equal protection of
the law. Custodial parents have used these rights to attack the requirement that
they obtain permission of the court before removing their child from the state. See
Comment, Child Custody: Best Interests of Children vs. ConstitutionalRights of Parents,
81 DICK. L. REv. 733, 746 (1977); Comment, RestrictiononaParent'sRighttoTravel
in Child Custody Cases: Possible ConstitutionalQuestions, 6 U.,C.D. L. REV. 181, 190
(1973).
2. 606 S.W.2d at 245.
3. A change of circumstances affecting only the noncustodial parent would
not alone, from the plain language of the statute, justify modification of the custody
award. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.390 (1978); note 6 infra. The appellate courts are
split on this question. See Eastes v. Eastes, 590 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Mo. App., E.D.
1979) (admissible only as evidence that custodian could provide acceptable
repository for child should court determine it is against child's best interests to remain in custody of his present custodian and is otherwise irrelevant); Kom v. Korn,
584 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979) (admissible for consideration as change
of circumstances, notwithstanding literal meaning of MO. REV. STAT. § 452.390
(1978); statute merely codifies long-standing decisional law); Kanady v. Kanady,
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remarry and move to California, where her new husband resided and was
employed, and that moving from the state was against the wishes of the child,
4
the wishes of the child's grandparents, and the child's best interests.
After considering all relevant .factors for child custody, including those
specifically enumerated in Missouri Revised Statutes section 452.375,5 the
trial court overruled Linda's motion to increase child support and sustained
Russel's motion to change custody of the child. 6 Russel was awarded child
custody, and Linda was granted reasonable visitation rights. The Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Southern District affirmed the decision, holding
that the modification was based on a substantial change of circumstances
7
and was in the best interests of the child.
The guiding principle in custody disputes is the child's best interests.
Missouri Revised Statutes section 452.3758 directs the court to consider all
relevant factors, including:
(1) The wishes of the child's parents...
(2) The wishes of a child... ;
(3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parents,
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interests;
(4) The child's adjustment to his home, school, community; and
(5) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 9
The Galeenercourt considered the factors in the statute and accorded great
weight to the child's preference to remain with his father and to the child's
relationship with his parents and others who could significantly affect his
interest. 10 In relying heavily on the child's preference, the Galeenercourt found
the child's preference to be an informed and reasoned choice. 11 To this ex527 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975) (Mo. REV. STAT. §452.390 (Cum.
Supp. 1975) merely codifies long-standing case law);J. v. E., 417 S.W.2d 199, 204
(Mo. App., Spr. 1967) (neither passage of time nor remarriage and establishment
of home alone is sufficient to sustain motion for change of custody).
4.

606 S.W.2d at 245-46.

5. (1978). See note 9 and accompanying text infra.
6. 606 S.W.2d at 246. Missouri requires proof of a substantial change of circumstances that affects the welfare of the child such that a change of custody will
substantially benefit the child. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.410 (1978).
7. 606 S.W.2d at 248. MO. SUP. CT. R. 73.01(3) governs the standard of
review forappellate review of cases tried without ajury or of an equitable nature.

For an interpretation of this rule, see Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo.
En Banc 1976).

8. (1978).
9.

Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (1978).

10.

606 S.W.2d at 247.
Id. In Missouri, if the child is mature enough to form and express an intelligent preference of custodial arrangements based on promoting his welfare, the
trial court should permit him to do so. Kanady v. Kanady, 527 S.W.2d 704, 707
11.
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tent, the decision is similar to other decisions in Missouri when custody was
12
changed because of the child's preference.
Galeener broke ranks with previous child preference cases, however, by
according so much weight to the child's preference despite the abundant
evidence of undue influence by Russel. He had given the child expensive gifts,
had taken the child on fun activities, and had told the child of violence in
California schools."3 Under these circumstances, the child's preference is not
only unreliable and not to be given much weight, but it may "provide the
court a reason for denying custody to the parent displaying the attention or
exercising the influence." 1 4 The court, however, made little reference to the
conflicting evidence.
Missouri generally has not permitted removal of the child from the province of the court because the court that awards custody "assumes a position
of guardianship with respect to... [the child's] person and future well being
....
,,15 Essentially, there is a presumption that removal is against the child's
best interests. This presumption, however, can be rebutted if the custodial
parent clearly shows that removal is in the child's best interests.1 6 Because
(Mo. App., K.C. 1975). See also Pender v. Pender, 598 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. App.,
W.D. 1980) (not error to fail to interview child when interview not requested by
parties and evidence suggested child did not wish to state preference due to feelings of loyalty toward both); Johnson v. Johnson, 526 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Mo. App.,
St. L. 1975) (children, ages six and four, who were confused about what was happening, lacked capacity to state intelligent preference).
12. J. v. E., 417 S.W.2d 199, 204 (Mo. App., Spr. 1967) (when both parents
are suitable, forcing child to remain with mother in opposition to his strong desire
to live with father would only make bad situation worse, especially when he will
soon be of age to make selection himself). But see In re Campbell, 599 S.W.2d 256,
259 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980) (fitness of both parents does not mean that best interests
of child served equally by either parent as custodian or that child's preference is
dispositive).
13. 606 S.W.2d at 250 (Billings, J., dissenting); id. at 252 (Prewitt, J.,
dissenting).
14. In re Campbell, 599 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980); Wells v.
Wells, 117 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Mo. App., St. L. 1938). The child's preference should
not be followed if it is inconsistent with his best interests. See, e.g., Schmidt v.
Schmidt, 591 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
15. Wald v. Wald, 168 Mo. App. 377, 384, 151 S.W. 786, 788-89 (St. L.
1922).
16. When removal is expressly prohibited in the decree or by statute, the
custodial parent must seek permission to remove and must shoulder the burden
of showing that there has been a change of circumstances such that it is in the child's
best interests to be removed from the state. Baer v. Baer, 51 S.W.2d 873, 878 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1932).
In the absence of a statute, when the decree is silent on the child's residence,
it does not impliedly prohibit removal. The burden is on the noncustodial parent
to show a change in circumstances that, in the child's best interests, requires that
removal be prohibited or custody changed. In such a case, removal itself is but a
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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of the presumption, courts do not weight the statutory factors equally. Those
that militate against removal are weighted more than the others, a practice
that has been criticized. 17 The Galeener majority may have begun with the
presumption and then relied heavily on factors that supported a denial of
removal.
The Galeenercourt gave much weight to the relationship of the child with
his parents and others who significantly affected his best interests. The court
compared the relationship between the child and his grandparents, teachers,
friends, and pastor with the relationships between the child and his stepfather and stepbrothers. It concluded the former was substantially better for
the child. 18 There are inherent difficulties with this comparison. The court
assumed that the relationship of the child with each of his parents deserved
equal weight. It compared a relationship that had had many years to develop,
the relationship between the child and his father and grandparents, with one
that had not begun, the relationship between the child and his stepfather
and stepbrothers. Furthermore, the majority did not consider alternative
forms of visitation that could have permitted these important relationships,
between the child and his grandparents and father, to continue and perhaps
to improve.1 9
Psychologists and legal scholars have suggested that the law emphasizes
the nonfinality of custody decisions at the expense of the "first and foremost
needs of children for stability of home environment and constancy and confactor to be considered. Durbin v. Durbin, 573 S.W.2d 146, 148-49 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1978) (when decree silent on removal, custodial parent may lawfully remove);
Middleton v. Tozer, 258 S.W.2d 80, 86-88 (Mo. App., St. L. 1953) (nothing in
Missouri's policy on removal requires custodial parent to request and receive permission before removal). Contra, In re Szamocki, 47 Cal. App. 3d 812, 818, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 231, 234 (1975) (removal from state is not approved even though not
specifically prohibited by decree).
17. Butler v. Butler, 83 N.H. 413, 416, 143 A. 471, 473 (1928) (no justification for any court to assume itself superior in dealing with state wards as state
wherein child currently resides may be trusted to safeguard welfare of child). Unfortunately, the principles of comity have proven insufficient as courts have shown
a willingness to modify other states' custody decisions. This willingness gave rise
to a serious problem: child-snatching. See generally Abduction of Child by Noncustodial
Parent:Damagesfor Custodial Parent'sMental Distress, 46 Mo. L. REV. 829 (1981).
The full faith and credit clause provides no solution to this problem because the
United States Supreme Court's view has been that a custody order is no more permanent in a sister state than it is in the state in which it was rendered. See generally
Hudak, Seize, Run, andSue: The Ignominy of Interstate Child Custody Litigation in American
Courts, 39 Mo. L. REV. 521, 528-33 (1974).
The problem is being addressed now by legislation on the state and federal level
with, among other things, at least thirty-eight states adopting the UNIFORM CHILD
CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT. Missouri's version is at Mo. REV. STAT.

452.440-.550 (1978).
18. 606 S.W.2d at 248.
19. See note 28 and accompanying text infra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/29
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tinuity of personal attachment formed [i.e., the "psychological parent"].
.

.."20 In one treatise, 2 1 the authors suggested that placing conditions on

the custodial parent relating to how the child should be raised, including
legally enforceable visitation rights of the noncustodial parent, is a source
of discontinuity. To give proper consideration to the psychological'needs
of a child, the authors conclude that an award of custody should be final:
once a parent has been chosen to have custody of the child, that parent, and
not the court, should determine the conditions under which the child will
22
be raised.
The child's need for a stable environment with the psychological parent
has been recognized in recent cases. 2 3 One leading case in this regard is
D'Onofio v. D'Onofrio,24 wherein the court stated:
The children, after the parents' divorce or separation, belong
to a different family unit than they did when the parents lived
together .... [ What is advantageousto that unit as a whole, to each of

its members individuallyand to the way they relate to each other andfunction
25
together is obviously in the best interests of the children.
Thus, the child's interests often will be served by permitting the custodial
parent to pursue economic or marital opportunities. 26 D'Onofrio, however,
suggests a balancing test between the advantages of moving, such as the opportunity for a better life style, and the disadvantages of moving, such as
fewer visits with the noncustodial parent.2 7 When the primary disadvantage
20. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child CustodyJurisdictionAct, 3 FAM. L.Q. 304,
304-05 (1969).
21. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST
OF THE CHILD 37-38 (2d ed. 1979).

22. Id. at 38. Missouri recognizes this conclusion to a degree. See Mo. REV.
STAT. 5 452.405 (1978).
23. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 591 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979) (some
value in keeping child with custodial parent as opposed to uprooting her and
transplanting her into new home with new custodians); Eastesv. Eastes, 590 S.W.2d
405, 408 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (after custody award, custodian presumed to remain suitable). See also MO. REV. STAT. § 452.410 (1978); notes 3 & 6 supra.
Concurring with the majority, Judge Hogan suggested that the child, who was
11 years old, soon would feel the stresses of adolescence. He reasoned that the move
itself would create instability during a time when the child most needed stability.
606 S.W.2d at 249 (Hogan, J., concurring).
24. 144 NJ. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), aff'dper curiam, 144 NJ.
Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976).
25. 144 NJ. Super. at 206, 365 A.2d at 29-30 (emphasis added).
26. See, e.g., In reArquilla, 85 Ill.
App. 3d 1090, 1093, 407 N.E.2d 948, 950
(1980) (trial court reversed because it failed to consider quality of life for both child
and custodial parent resulting from move).
27. The effect on the court's jurisdiction or on the decretal visitation privileges
of the noncustodial parent is insufficient alone to deny removal or change custody.
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is the effect on visitation privileges, many courts have altered the visitation
28
privileges of the noncustodial parent to alleviate the disadvantage.
Following this approach, removal should be permitted when the custodial
parent has a legitimate reason for moving from the state and there are no
counterbalancing reasons against it. 29 Legitimate reasons include an advantageous employment opportunity for the custodial parent,30 remarriage,31
advantageous employment opportunity for the custodial parent's new
spouse, 32 and the desire to raise the child near family.3 3 Reasons held inSee Dozier v. Dozier, 167 Cal. App. 2d 714, 719, 334 P.2d 957, 961 (1959); In re
Ortiz, 541 P.2d 1266, 1267 (Colo. App. 1975); Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232, .,
413 A.2d 834, 838 (1979); In re Burgham, 86 Ill. App. 3d 341, 346, 408 N.E.2d
37, 40-41 (1980); In re Bard, 603 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980) (per
curiam); Hahn v. Hahn, 569 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Girvin
v. Girvin, 471 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Mo. App., St. L. 1971); In re Padbury, 46 Or.
App. 533, -, 612 P.2d 321, 323 (1980). Contra, Becker v. Becker, 75 A.D.2d
814, 814, 427 N.Y.S.2d 492, 492 (1980) (mem.).
28. For example, courts have allowed longer visits or temporary custody during the summer, which serve the parent-child relationship better by requiring the
noncustodial parent to exercise parental responsibility. See, e.g., D'Onofrio v.
D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 207, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div.), aff'dpercuriam,
144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976).
29. See Pender v. Pender, 598 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980). If
the child's preference in Galeener were given less weight, Galeener would be very
similar to Girvin v. Girvin, 471 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. App., St. L. 1971). In Girvin,
pleading and proving remarriage, past custody, a need to move from the state, and
the tender age of the child were sufficient to allow removal.
30. See In re Arquilla, 85 111. App. 3d 1090, 407 N.E.2d 948 (1980) (custodial
parent's efforts to enhance standard of living serves best interest of both); In re
Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1978) (relocation offered beneficial possibilities or
at least lack of detriment); Jafari v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622, 284 N.W.2d 554 (1979)
(employment opportunity necessary for advancement, offered better salary, and
no evidence that children would suffer disadvantage); Middlekauffv. Middlekauff,
161 N.J. Super. 84, 390 A.2d 1202 (App. Div. 1978) (settlement agreement required
custodial parent to obtain employment within two years and graduate studies
necessary for employment; same is best for post-divorce family unit and in best interest of children).
31. See Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 395, 396 (La. App. 1968).
32. See Pender v. Pender, 598 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980) (husband had permanent employment in Colorado; climate and recreation better in
Colorado for family); Good v. Good, 384 S.W.2d 98, 100-01 (Mo. App., St. L.
1965) (husband transferred involuntarily; noncustodial parent opposed removal
but offered no alternatives; court left with expectation that denying removal might
divide married couple or cause custodial parent to abandon children). But see Stuessi
v. Stuessi, 307 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Mo. App., K.C. 1957) (permission to remove
denied although husband had accepted new employment in Tennessee, based on
speculative nature of move).
33. See In re McGee, 613 P.2d 345 (Colo. App. 1980) (removal to Switzerland
where parents resided); In re Young, 529 P. 2d 344 (Colo. App. 1974) (all grandhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/29
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sufficient include the custodial parent's belief that there are employment opportunities in another state when no particular empl6yment opportunity has
3 5
been offered3 and the personal convenience of the custodial parent.
The dissenters in Galeener,D'Onofio, and similar cases have recognized
two important factors. First, children need a stable relationship with a parent;
they are not as adaptable to a change of custodians as once thought. 36 Second, since society is highly mobile, equity demands that custodians and noncustodians be free to travel where their opportunities may be found and to
have their families with them.3 Furthermore, they argue that parents' decisions should not deprive the noncustodial parent of visitation.3 8 The Galeener
court, however, gave greater weight to other factors, perhaps due to the
parochial view that the child's best interests are served by remaining within
this state.
Galeener stands as a warning to custodial parents who wish to leave
Missouri. The difference of opinion between the majority and the dissenters,
however, illustrates the disagreement on the strength of the presumption
parents lived in Minnesota, where parent sought to move); Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177
Conn. 232, 413 A.2d 834 (1979) (removal to Holland); Lucy K.H. v. Carl W.H.,
415 A.2d 510 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1979) (not unnatural for mother to decide it was in
child's best interest to be raised in mother's home town; Delaware statute authorizes
custodial parent to determine child's residence); Markam v. Markam, 429 S.W.2d
320 (Mo. App., K.C. 1968) (maternal grandmother's home offered more desirable
surroundings).
34. See Dupree v. Dupree, 357 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App., St. L. 1962); Weiss
v. Weiss, 76 A.D.2d 863, 428 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1980) (mem.), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 170,
418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981).
35. See Baer v. Baer, 51 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Mo. App., St. L. 1932) (court's
decision influenced by wife's desire to move to avoid embarassment of ex-husband's
remarriage). See also Quirin v. Quirin, 50 Ill. App. 3d 785, 789, 365 N.E.2d 226,
228 (1977) (desire to satisfy new husband's hunting and fishing interests insufficient). But see In re Burgham, 86 Ill. App. 3d 341, 344, 408 N.E.2d 37, 39 (1980)
(Quirin did not hold that court could not give any weight to personal desires of
custodial parent).
36. 606 S.W.2d at 251 (Prewitt, J., dissenting); Korn v. Korn, 584 S.W.2d
179, 181 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979); Hahn v. Hahn, 569 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Mo. App.,
St. L. 1978); Clouse v. Clouse, 545 S.W.2d 402, 407-08 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
37. 606 S.W.2d at 249 (Billings, J., dissenting); id. at 251 (Prewitt, J., dissenting); In re Bard, 603 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980); D'Onofrio v.
D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 207-08, 365 A.2d 27, 30-33 (Ch. Div.) (by implication), aff'dper curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976).
See note 1 supra.
38. Grayv. Gray, 57111. App. 2d 1, 6,372 N.E.2d 909,913(1978); D'Onofrio
v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 207-08, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div.), aff'dper
curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976). While at one time,
removal may have denied visitation, today's greater mobility minimizes travel
problems.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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against removal. Unless the custodian overcomes the presumption that
removal from Missouri is not in the child's best interests, the court will be
willing to force him to choose between his children and moving. The mobility
of today's society requires that the court permit removal when the custodian has a legitimate reason for leaving. When the custodian seeks removal
and the noncustodian seeks a change of custody, the court should carefully
consider the child's need for stability in his family unit along with alternative
forms of visitation. If the court considers the child's wishes, it should not
allow the presumption against removal to blind it to undue influence by the
noncustodian.
FLOYD T. NORRICK
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